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INTRODUCTION
On January 26, 1993, after eight hours of deliberation, twelve
jurors sentenced Charles Rhines to death.1 During jury selection be-
fore the trial, Rhines’s lawyers asked all but one juror if they harbored
any biases against Rhines because he is a gay man.2 One juror said
that she thought of Rhines’s life choices as “sinful” but that it would
not impact her decision making.3 During the guilt phase, all of the
jurors learned of Rhines’s sexuality through the testimony of a witness
1. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 5–6, Rhines v. South Dakota, 138 S. Ct. 2660
(2018) (No. 17-8791).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id.
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who saw him “cuddling” another man, and another witness testified
that he had been in a relationship with Rhines.4 After finding Rhines
guilty of first-degree murder, the same jurors listened to the state’s
penalty phase case, which incorporated victim impact testimony, and
to the testimony of Rhines’s family.5 After spending some time deliber-
ating, the jurors sent the judge a note asking the following questions,
among others: “Will Mr. Rhines be allowed to mix with the general in-
mate population[?]”; “[Will he be] allowed to create a group of follow-
ers or admirers[?]”; “Will Mr. Rhines be allowed to marry or have
conjugal visits[?]”; and “Will Mr. Rhines be jailed alone or will he have
a cellmate[?]”6 The trial court provided no extra information to answer
the jurors’ questions, and the jury shortly sentenced Rhines to death.7
Rhines appealed his sentence and conviction and lost.8
Rhines was unable to introduce on appeal the biased questions
the jurors asked during the eight hours of deliberation because of
South Dakota’s no-impeachment rule, which mirrors Rule 606 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.9 Recent interviews with jurors showed
dangerous bias against Rhines, with a juror remembering that “the
jury ‘also knew that [Mr. Rhines] was a homosexual and thought that
he shouldn’t be able to spend his life with men in prison.’ ”10 A second
juror remembered that “[o]ne juror made . . . a comment that if he’s
gay, [they]’d be sending him where he wants to go if [they] voted for
[life imprisonment without the possibility of parole].”11 A third juror
said, “There was lots of discussion of homosexuality. There was a lot
of disgust. This is a farming community. . . . There were lots of folks
who were like[,] Ew, I can’t believe that.”12
While Rhines was imprisoned on death row, the Supreme Court
decided Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, and so found an exception to
the juror no-impeachment rule in cases of racial bias.13 Rhines argued
that the exception should apply to more than racial bias, including
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 6. Rhines later appealed and the
South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. Rhines claimed
that the jury held an anti-gay bias based on a note they sent the judge, but the South
Dakota Supreme Court specifically found that the note did not reflect bias. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 7. Compare FED. R. EVID. 606, with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-606
(2019).
10. Id. at 7–8.
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Rhines also alleged that one juror referred to him
as an “SOB queer,” and another juror thought that Rhines “might be ‘a “sexual threat to
other inmates and take advantage of other young men in or outside of prison.” ’ ” Id. at
7 n.4.
13. 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
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sexual bias.14 Rhines’s appeals on this matter have been exhausted;
the South Dakota Supreme Court found that he did not meet the re-
quisite bar for the exception to apply, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in June 2018.15 Rhines currently remains on death row.16
This Note will argue that Peña-Rodriguez should be expanded
to apply to post-conviction cases where jurors have made clear state-
ments of bias against the sexual orientation, sex, or religion of a de-
fendant, creating an exception to Rule 606. Part I will cover the
tensions between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence
606, defining varied applications of Rule 606 and the Supreme Court
decisions determining Rule 606’s scope. Part II will discuss Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado in detail and the differences between the major-
ity and minority’s rationales. Part III will argue that the exception
created to Rule 606 in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado should be expanded
to cover biases against sexuality, sex, and religion. Part IV will ad-
dress concerns about expanding the Peña-Rodriguez exception.
I. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 606
A. Promises of the Sixth Amendment and Evidentiary
Requirements of Rule 606(b)
There is inherent tension between the Sixth Amendment and
Rule 606.17 The Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .”18 The Constitution requires that defendants receive
“a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hear-
ing.”19 Simply put, a fair and impartial trial does not equate to a
perfect one, and an impartial jury is made up of jurors who only con-
sider the evidence presented to them at trial.20 The fundamental
principles behind the Sixth Amendment clash with the Federal Rule
14. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8–9.
15. Rhines v. South Dakota, 138 S. Ct. 2660, 2660 (2018); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 1, at 10.
16. Ría Tabacco Mar, A Jury May Have Sentenced a Man to Death Because He’s Gay.
And the Justices Don’t Care., N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/06/19/opinion/charles-rhines-gay-jury-death-row.html [http://perma.cc/49XA-ETBV].
17. For a more in-depth treatment of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 606, see Amanda
R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . But Should It?:
A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA
L. REV. 262, 262, 264–65 (2012).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
20. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
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of Evidence 606(b), which prohibits inquiry into the inner deliberations
of the jury.21 Rule 606(b) reads as follows:
Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into
the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about
any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s
deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another
juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict
or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evi-
dence of a juror’s statement on these matters.22
Despite the strong protections provided above, Congress foresaw
a few scenarios in which the veil to the jury room should be pierced.23
“A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial infor-
mation was improperly bought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside
influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.”24 These codi-
fied exceptions are very limited; jurors can only testify about issues
during jury deliberation if the jury considered extraneous information
or an outside influence unduly bore upon deliberation.25 Testimony
of juror bias during jury deliberation does not fit easily into either
exception because it is not extraneous information, nor is it an outside
influence.26 When a juror presents evidence or testimony that an-
other juror was prejudiced or was in some way unable to render an
impartial verdict, the Sixth Amendment demands that evidence be
accepted, and Rule 606 bars its admission.27
B. Court Compromises
Courts have adapted to the tension between the promises of the
Sixth Amendment and Rule 606 in various ways, including holding
that the Sixth Amendment can supersede Rule 606, but each state
and federal jurisdiction does protect jury deliberation from impeach-
ment.28 The protections for jury deliberations in Rule 606 are based
on the Mansfield Rule, which prohibited jurors from testifying on
mental processes or events that happened during deliberation.29 The
Mansfield Rule has been interpreted in three different ways. First,
21. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
22. Id.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. EVID. 606.
28. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865, 869 (2017) (“Some version of the
no-impeachment rule is followed in every [s]tate.”).
29. Id. at 863.
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Texas applies the “Outside Influence” Rule, as codified in the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.30 In this interpretation, jurors can only
testify to outside influences, such as threats made to jurors during
deliberation.31 This interpretation significantly limits juror testimony
and has strayed the least from the Mansfield Rule.32 Second, the Fed-
eral Rules also allow for juror testimony for “events extraneous to
the deliberative process,” including juror consultation of dictionaries
or newspapers.33 Finally, some jurisdictions follow the “Iowa rule.”34
The “Iowa rule” spawned from the 1866 Iowa Supreme Court decision
in Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Telephone Co., in which the court
ruled that jurors could testify to facts that happened during deliber-
ation.35 In jurisdictions following the “Iowa rule,” jurors are prohib-
ited from testifying about their own subjective beliefs, but they may
testify about objective facts and events that occurred during delibera-
tion.36 The Supreme Court disfavors the “Iowa rule” and seems to
prefer the Federal Rule as a balance between the two extremes.37
Prior to Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court addressed the scope
of Rule 606 only twice.38 However, it has dealt with the common-law
equivalent, finding exceptions for the “gravest and most important
cases,” in McDonald v. Pless.39 In the first case regarding the scope
of Rule 606, Tanner v. United States, the Court ruled that juror intoxi-
cation and drug use was not an “outside influence.”40 After Tanner’s
conviction, his attorney received an unsolicited visit from a member
of the jury who said that during the trial several other jurors became
intoxicated during breaks, he and two other jurors smoked marijuana
throughout the trial, and others ingested cocaine three to five times
throughout the trial.41 The Court refused to find an exception, basing
its reasoning on concerns that attorneys would harass jurors after
litigation, destroying the freedom of discussion during deliberation,
and that the exception would undermine the willingness of jurors to
return an unpopular verdict.42 The Court also examined several public
30. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b).
31. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 155 S.W.3d 382, 412 (Tex. Ct. App.
2004), rev’d on other grounds, 204 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. 2006).
32. See McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 163–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Cochran,
J., dissenting).
33. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2); Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
34. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
35. 20 Iowa 195, 212 (1866).
36. Id. at 210–11.
37. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
38. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866.
39. 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
40. 483 U.S. 107, 122 (1987).
41. Id. at 115–16.
42. Id. at 120–21, 124–26.
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policy considerations, such as the finality of litigation and chilling full
and free debate in deliberation by allowing in evidence about juror
intoxication, determining in particular that voir dire allows for
counsel to weed out any jurors incapable of judging impartially.43
Juror intoxication and drug use are therefore not an exception to
Rule 606(b)(1).44
The issue of voir dire as a protection for defendants’ Sixth Amend-
ment rights is a particularly thorny one that will be discussed in
greater detail in Part III of this Note.45 Suffice to say, voir dire is the
examination of prospective jurors for selection for trial.46 The Su-
preme Court has more fully explored voir dire as a protection for
defendant’s rights in the Court’s second decision on the scope of Rule
606.47 Warger v. Shauers was a civil case that dealt with juror dishon-
esty during voir dire.48 During voir dire, each juror was asked if he
or she could be fair and impartial during the trial and was given the
chance to answer if he or she could not.49 After rendering a verdict for
the defendant, a juror approached the plaintiff’s attorney about the
conduct of another juror who had expressed that her daughter had
been in a similar situation to the defendant’s situation.50 Despite clear
dishonesty during voir dire by the prejudiced juror, the Court upheld
the no-impeachment rule by finding no exception for a juror who fails
to disclose pro-defendant bias.51 Additionally, the Court stated, “Even
if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror impartiality
is adequately assured by the parties’ ability to bring to the court’s
attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to
employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered.”52
More importantly, the Court echoed its old warning that there
are some cases of “juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition,
the jury trial right has been abridged.”53 It further explained what
the Court would do with such a case, leaving itself open to balancing
the jury system requirements and the rights of the individual defen-
dant.54 The Court then left the exception to the no-impeachment
43. Id. at 124, 127 (“Petitioners’ Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury,
on the other hand, are protected by several aspects of the trial process.”).
44. Id. at 122.
45. See infra Part III.
46. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 n.3 (Mo. 2010).
47. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014).
48. Id. at 524.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 530.
52. Id. at 529.
53. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 530 n.3.
54. See id. (“If and when such a case arises, the Court can consider whether the usual
safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.”).
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rule in McDonald and its predecessors but still only in “the gravest
and most important cases.”55 In such an important case, excluding
juror testimony would “violat[e] the plainest principles of justice.”56
II. THE GRAVEST AND MOST IMPORTANT CASE:
PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO
A. Statement of Facts
The Court found its exception for the most important case in a
sexual assault trial: Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado.57 Prosecutors
brought charges against Peña-Rodriguez based on an alleged sexual
assault in a bathroom.58 Prospective jurors were repeatedly asked
whether they believed that they could be fair and impartial and the
court encouraged them to speak if they had any concerns about im-
partiality.59 None of the jurors indicated that they could not be im-
partial.60 The jury found the defendant guilty after a three day trial,
and two jurors approached defendant’s counsel and said that another
juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias.61
With permission of the court, both jurors signed affidavits describ-
ing comments during deliberation.62 The jurors swore that another
juror, identified as H.C., told fellow jurors that he “believed the defen-
dant was guilty because, in [his] experience as an ex–law enforcement
officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they
could do whatever they wanted with women.”63 They also said that
H.C. stated, “Mexican men are physically controlling of women be-
cause of their sense of entitlement,” and “I think he did it because
he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”64 The “trial
court acknowledged H.C.’s apparent bias” but found that the delib-
erations were protected under Rule 606(b), so it would not overturn
the verdict.65
55. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
56. Id. (citing United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1852); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892)).
57. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
58. Id. at 861.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 861–62.
63. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
64. Id.
65. Id.
174 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:167
B. A Sixth Amendment Issue Masquerading as a Fourteenth
Amendment Issue
The Supreme Court found that there was an exception to Rule
606 when jurors engage in racial bias and remanded Peña-Rodri-
guez to the lower court.66 The Court took a Sixth Amendment issue
and framed it within the Fourteenth Amendment.67 The ruling is
not designed to “perfect the jury but to ensure . . . the promise of
equal treatment under the law that is so central to a functioning
democracy.”68 It first distinguished racial bias from the pro-defen-
dant bias in Warger and juror intoxication in Tanner, finding racial
bias to be more serious.69 Racial bias was an “evil that, if left unad-
dressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”70
In distinguishing racial bias, the Court noted that the safeguards
mentioned in Tanner are less effective in these cases.71 Specifically,
voir dire can be insufficient in determining racial bias cases because
generic questions may not expose bias, and pointed questions about
bias could exacerbate prejudice without actually exposing it.72 In
addition to finding the Tanner safeguards inadequate, the Court
also found that such cases must be addressed to prevent a “loss of
confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of
the Sixth Amendment trial right.”73 The Court held
where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she
relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal de-
fendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment
rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the
evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the
jury trial guarantee.74
66. Id. at 869, 871.
67. See id. at 867–69.
68. Id. at 868.
69. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 869.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Court did not define “clear” or the threshold showing in order to inquire
into claims of racial bias. See Commonwealth v. Young, No. 1305, 2018 WL 2947919, at
*5–6 (Pa. Super. June 13, 2018). Additionally, it failed to define the appropriate standard
of review for appeals applying the Peña-Rodriguez exception to Rule 606. See Brief of
Appellant at 24, United States v. Birchette, 908 F.3d 50 (2018) (No. 17-4450) 2017 WL
5997873, at *24.
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Although the Court used language related to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, finding that an exception for racial bias is necessary because
“equal treatment under the law . . . is so central to a functioning
democracy,” they held that the Sixth Amendment required an excep-
tion to Rule 606.75 As such, the Court expanded the power of the
Sixth Amendment.76 Justice Alito dissented.77 He opined that “[t]his
disparate treatment is unsupportable under the Sixth Amendment.
If the Sixth Amendment requires the admission of juror testimony
about statements or conduct during deliberations that show one
type of juror partiality, then statements or conduct showing any
type of partiality should be treated the same way.”78 In other words,
he believed that once the door to the jury room had been cracked
open just a little for racial bias, the door should be opened for exam-
ination for other forms of bias, as well.79 He also noted:
Recasting this as an equal protection case would not provide a
ground for limiting the holding to cases involving racial bias. At
a minimum, cases involving bias based on any suspect classifi-
cation—such as national origin or religion—would merit equal
treatment. So, I think, would bias based on sex . . . . Indeed,
convicting a defendant on the basis of any irrational classifica-
tion would violate the Equal Protection Clause.80
Justice Alito’s dissent is correct that several other classifications of
bias could easily justify the same treatment as racial bias under
Peña-Rodriguez, such as sexual orientation, religion, and sex.81 Just
like the racial bias noted in Peña-Rodriguez, jurors can be and have
been biased against sexual orientation, religion, and sex.82 Just like
racial bias, voir dire is insufficient in discovering these biases in
potential jurors, and even when they are discovered, rehabilitation
does not remove them. Finally, the continued existence of biases
against sexual orientation and sex undermines citizen trust in the
justice system, just like racial bias.
75. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868–69.
76. See id. at 869.
77. Id. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 883.
79. Id. at 883–84.
80. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81. See infra Part IV.
82. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delp, 672 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996);
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Mo. 2010); cf. Harlee v. District
of Columbia, 558 F.2d 351, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding no support for appellant’s claim
that gender bias played a role in his conviction).
176 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:167
III. EXPANDING PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION,
RELIGION, AND SEX
A. Examples of Specific Bias Within the Jury System
1. Sexual Orientation
Biases based on sexual orientation, sex, and religion could all
meet the standard dictated in Peña-Rodriguez, as voir dire is insuffi-
cient to protect defendants against these biases, and each bias could
undermine belief in the legal system.83 There are several noteworthy
cases beyond Charles Rhine’s that expose systemic juror biases
against LGBTQ individuals.84 In Commonwealth v. Delp, Christian
Delp was convicted of three counts of child rape.85 The week after he
was convicted, a juror approached the trial judge on “a matter of
conscience.”86 The juror stated in a letter that “[his] verdict was bias
[sic] at the conclusion of Christian Delp’s trial.”87 The juror’s letter
spawned a hearing and the juror testified that he “had felt that [he],
[himself], had found Christian Delp guilty solely on his apparent
homosexuality.”88 The court found that despite the juror’s testimony
that the he had found Delp guilty because of Delp’s sexuality, the
juror’s “uncorroborated posttrial testimony” did not necessitate a
new trial.89 The court affirmed that public policy dictated that jurors
should keep secret conversation and their personal thoughts during
deliberation.90
More recent cases also expose juror bias against LGBTQ indi-
viduals.91 Eric Patrick was convicted of first-degree murder in
2009.92 Patrick’s jury recommended the death penalty with a seven
to five vote, and the trial court sentenced him to death.93 During voir
dire, a juror stated that he “would have a bias if [he] knew the
perpetrator was homosexual.”94 When asked about holding the
83. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text; infra notes 84–143 and accom-
panying text.
84. See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253, 265 (Fla. 2018); Delp, 672 N.E.2d at 117.
85. 672 N.E.2d at 115.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 117.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253, 262–63 (Fla. 2018)
92. Id. at 257.
93. Id. at 258.
94. Id. at 263.
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prosecution to the proper burden of proof, he answered, “Put it this
way, if [he] felt the person was a homosexual, [he] personally be-
lieve[d] that person is morally depraved enough that he might lie,
might steal, might kill.”95 He also answered yes when asked if his
expressed bias might affect deliberations.96 The Florida Supreme
Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing after vacating
Patrick’s death sentence.97
Researchers have come to similar conclusions about implicit bias
against sexual orientation.98 In a 2009 study, researchers examined
the effects of defendant’s sexual orientation on juror’s perceptions
on a mock child sexual assault case.99 A racially and religiously di-
verse sample of mock jurors read a fact pattern laying out, through
prosecution witness testimony and the defendant’s statement, a
brief case of a male teacher sexually abusing a student.100 The male
teacher was either gay or straight, and the victim was either a boy
or a girl.101 The mock jurors also read applicable jury instructions
about the burden of proof and the elements of the crime.102 Re-
searchers found that the mock jurors made “significantly more pro-
prosecution judgements in cases involving gay as compared to straight
defendants.”103 The mock jurors were more likely to convict a gay
defendant, more likely to find the gay defendant as less credible than
a straight one, and more likely to attribute more culpability to a gay
defendant.104 The jurors were also more likely to feel that the defen-
dant needed to be punished and more likely to believe that sexual
contact did occur.105 The researchers concluded that “compared to
straight defendants, defendants perceived to be gay face unfair pre-
sumptions of guilt in child sexual abuse cases.”106 Clearly, biases
against sexual orientation exist and critically affect trial outcomes
in the same way that biases against race affected the initial trial
outcome of Peña-Rodriguez.107
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Patrick, 246 So. 3d at 265.
98. See, e.g., Tisha R. A. Wiley & Bette L. Bottoms, Effects of Defendant Sexual Orienta-
tion on Jurors’ Perceptions of Child Sexual Assault, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 46–47 (2009).
99. Id. at 46.
100. Id. at 48–49.
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 54.
104. Wiley & Bottoms, supra note 98, at 54. The jurors were also more likely to find
victims more credible when the defendant was gay. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 55.
107. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 870 (2017).
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2. Religion
Jurors have also expressed religious bias against defendants and
have still remained on the jury.108 In People v. Al-Turki, Homaidan Al-
Turki was convicted of unlawful sexual contact, extortion, false im-
prisonment, and several other charges in 2006.109 The court asked
each of the 106 potential jurors to give their reaction to the fact that
“the defendant, the complaining witness, and the other witnesses in
this case are Muslims.”110 The court also asked general questions
about the jurors’ ability to be impartial.111 After counsel whittled the
106 potential jurors to 12 and as the court swore in jury members, a
juror interrupted and began to share his personal thoughts on the
“Muslim religion.”112 He stated that he thought that “a person of [the
Muslim] faith would commit a crime if . . . the faith conflicted with
the laws of [the United States] government.”113 While this juror
expressed bias while the jury was being sworn in, it was not caught
because of voir dire, and so could have easily been mentioned during
deliberations.114
Religious bias is also seen in civil cases.115 In Fleshner v. Pepose
Vision Institution, P.C., a juror made multiple anti-Semitic comments
about a witness.116 After the jury was dismissed, a juror approached
counsel and described the anti-Semitic statements made by that
juror during deliberation.117 The juror allegedly said, “She is a Jewish
witch,” “She is a Jewish bitch,” “She is a penny-pinching Jew,” and
“She was such a cheap Jew that she did not want to pay Plaintiff un-
employment compensation.”118 Though Missouri followed the stricter
interpretation of the Mansfield Rule, the Missouri Supreme Court
ruled that statements exhibiting “religious bias or prejudice deny
the parties their constitutional rights to a trial by 12 fair and impar-
tial jurors and equal protection of the law.”119 The court noted that
108. Marc W. Pearce & Samantha L. Schwartz, Can Jurors’ Religious Biases Affect
Verdicts in Criminal Trials?, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (July 8, 2010), https://www.apa.org/moni
tor/2010/07-08/jn.aspx [http://perma.cc/3H2V-JDDX].
109. Id. The decision is unpublished but referred to in People v. Al-Turki, 2017 COA
39, ¶ 2 (Ct. App. Colo. 2017).
110. Pearce & Schwartz, supra note 108.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Mo. 2010).
116. Id. at 86.
117. Id.
118. Id. Another juror approached counsel and reported that anti-Semitic comments
were made during deliberation but did not describe exactly what was said. Id.
119. Id. at 87, 89–90 (emphasis added).
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a religiously biased juror holds negative stereotypes that would pre-
vent him or her from making verdicts based on the facts and law
presented at trial.120
In a psychological discussion about Al-Turki’s appeal, Marc
Pearce and Samantha Schwartz summarized relevant background
research about anti-Muslim bias.121 They noted that research indi-
cated that “associating Muslims with negative attributes (such as
terrorism) can create implicit biases.”122 They also stated that the
use of negative associations could create a bias against a Muslim
defendant.123 A court found such a case in 2010 in which a prosecu-
tor created bias against a Muslim defendant in South Carolina.124
Angle Vazquez was charged and found guilty of two counts of mur-
der and other assorted crimes.125 During the sentencing phase of the
trial, a witness testified that Vazquez was a Muslim.126 Counsel had
screened each potential juror about anti-Muslim bias during voir
dire.127 Vazquez’s trial also overlapped with the second anniversary
of 9/11, a fact that the prosecutor took advantage of when he argued
that Vazquez should be given the death penalty because he was a
“domestic terrorist.”128 The South Carolina Supreme Court overturned
Vazquez’s sentence because the prosecution appealed to “prejudice
involving anti-Muslim sentiment.”129 Consequently, bias against cer-
tain religions has had the same effect that racial bias had in Peña-
Rodriguez: it poisoned jury deliberation.
3. Sex
Claims of juror bias against sex are raised rarely and usually
fail as it is difficult to show.130 More often, cases are appealed for
120. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 90.
121. Pearce & Schwartz, supra note 108.
122. Id. “This finding suggests that people who are exposed to negative portrayals of
Muslims . . . might develop anti-Muslim biases . . . .” Id.
123. Id.
124. Vasquez v. State, 698 S.E.2d 561, 567 (S.C. 2010).
125. Id. at 562–63.
126. Id. at 563.
127. Id. at 568.
128. Id. at 563. “The solicitor, who characterized Petitioner as a ‘domestic terrorist’
during his opening guilt phase statements, drew a correlation between the events of
September 11th and those for which Petitioner was charged.” Id.
129. Vasquez, 698 S.E.2d at 569.
130. See Harlee v. District of Columbia, 558 F.2d 351, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Harlee was
convicted of indecent exposure and argued that his Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated, first by having a jury with disproportionately more women than men for his com-
munity, and second by the trial court refusing to question potential jurors about “prejudices
involving men.” Id. at 352–54. The court rejected both claims, as the defendant provided
no evidence the underrepresentation of men was a result of systematic exclusion and
that jurors were biased against his sex. Id. at 353–54.
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bias against sex during voir dire as opposed to after deliberation.131
The Supreme Court demonstrated concern for biases against sex in
voir dire.132 In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Supreme Court expanded
Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the prosecution cannot exercise
a peremptory strike in voir dire on the basis of race, to peremptory
strikes on the basis of sex.133 The Court referred to the long history
of prejudice against women in the jury system.134 The Court found
that, just like in cases of race, “gender simply may not serve as a proxy
for bias.”135 While juror biases against sex are rarely argued, it is
likely that the concern for sex biases in jury selection would apply to
sex biases against the defendant.136
Researchers, too, have tracked biases against defendant gen-
ders.137 Jurors are more likely to find men guilty of both assault and
theft and applied harsher punishments when the victim was female.138
In studies designed to test the effect of defendant gender on alibi
credibility, mock jurors found the female defendant to be more femi-
nine, more credible, more likeable, and therefore less likely to be
guilty.139 The mock jurors read about a spousal homicide case with
opening and closing statements, prosecution witness statements, and
the defendant’s statement containing his or her alibi.140 The more the
mock jurors believed the defendant’s alibi, which was also manipu-
lated into becoming more feminine or masculine, the less likely they
were to find the defendant guilty.141 Female defendants with femi-
nine alibis were seen as more trustworthy by the mock jurors as a
whole.142 Bias against sexual orientation, religion, and sex are present
in the legal system, both explicitly, evident through court cases, and
131. See United States v. Analetto, 807 F.3d 423, 425 (1st Cir. 2015). The defendant
in Analetto contended that the prosecution had used its peremptory strikes against eight
male jurors. Id. The trial court found that the eighth strike was impermissibly based on
sex. Id. at 426.
132. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
133. Id. at 127, 129 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
134. Id. at 131–35.
135. Id. at 143.
136. See id. at 153 (“We do not prohibit racial and gender bias in jury selection only
to encourage it in jury deliberations. Once seated, a juror should not give free rein to
some racial or gender bias of his or her own. . . . A juror who allows racial or gender bias to
influence assessment of the case breaches the compact and renounces his or her oath.”).
137. See Susan Yamamoto & Evelyn M. Maeder, A Case of Culture: Defendant Gender
and Juror Decision-Making, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3090, 3090 (2017).
138. Id. at 3095. Later research indicates that the stereotype linking men to crime has
weakened, though by what degree varies by case type. Id. at 3096.
139. Evelyn M. Maeder & Julie L. Dempsey, A Likely Story? The Influence of Type of
Alibi and Defendant Gender on Juror Decision-Making, 20 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L.
543, 550 (2013).
140. Id. at 547.
141. Id. at 550.
142. Id.
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implicitly, as shown through research.143 These biases, like racial
bias, affect jurors and deliberation in a very real way.
B. Procedural Safeguards Are Insufficient in Removing Biased
Jurors
1. Voir Dire’s Insufficiency to Remove Biased Jurors
Voir dire is the process of questioning and weeding out jurors
who cannot be impartial.144 “Ideally,” as the court in Fleshner stated,
“the potential jurors’ answers to questioning during voir dire would
reveal every bias or prejudice. Those potential jurors expressing biases
or prejudices would be stricken.”145 Aware of the realities of the justice
system, the court also noted that potential jurors are unlikely to ad-
mit to any biases openly in court, particularly those about religion
or ethnicity.146 Citizens who are called for jury duty will sometimes
ask whether or not they can lie during voir dire, showing how uncom-
fortable they are with sharing their biases.147 As a practical matter,
Warger went to the Supreme Court because a juror explicitly lied dur-
ing voir dire when she said that she had no bias toward either party.148
Moreover, lawyers’ questions during voir dire are often not de-
signed to gain information about a bias, but are designed to further
a particular theory of a case; for example, on a theory of self-defense,
counsel could ask questions about whether jurors felt as if they
needed to retreat in a dangerous situation.149 “The voir dire process,
for the most part, is stuck in the 19th century.”150 Both the prosecution
and defense have “virtually no information” about their potential
jurors besides names; most jurisdictions do not conduct background
checks on jurors.151 As a consequence, counsel conducting voir dire
143. See supra notes 83–142 and accompanying text.
144. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 n.3 (Mo. 2010).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Amy Bloom, Jack Shafer, & Kenji Yoshino, Can I Hide My Beliefs During
Jury Selection?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08
/magazine/can-i-hide-my-beliefs-during-jury-selection.html [http://perma.cc/2NWZ-MYY5].
A citizen in a Midwestern state asked if he or she should lie during voir dire “so [he or
she] can subvert an unfair system.” Id.
148. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 524 (2014).
149. See Cathy E. Bennett, Robert B. Hirschhorn, & Heather R. Epstein, How to Con-
duct a Meaningful & Effective Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 46 SMU L.R. 659, 660 (1993).
The authors suggest that jury selection has three main goals: eliciting juror information,
educating jurors about the defense theory of the case, and establishing a relationship
between the attorney and the jurors. Id.
150. Molly McDonough, Rogue Jurors, ABA J. (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.abajournal
.com/magazine/article/rogue_jurors [http://perma.cc/92S4-P86D].
151. Id.
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does so in the dark.152 Voir dire is also seen as a less important part
of trial, as lawyers spend little time on it.153
Additionally, voir dire often fails to eliminate “stealth” and
“rogue” jurors.154 “Stealth” jurors have an agenda while “rogue” jurors
lie during voir dire and deliberately hang juries.155 While “rogue”
jurors are rare, “stealth” jurors can be a problem.156 Beyond jurors
who intentionally try to manipulate the system, jurors often experi-
ence fear and try to please the judge and therefore do not tell the
truth during voir dire.157 Beyond fear of the courthouse, certain ques-
tions during voir dire put the potential jurors in tight spots; some
worry about disclosing prior crimes in fear that they might lose their
jobs.158 Jurors who want to please judges may also mislead counsel
during voir dire.159 Judge Gregory E. Mize studied juror answers
and found that some jurors always gave what they thought was the
answer the judge wanted to hear in court, but when asked privately,
would change their answer.160
How effective voir dire is depends on who is asking the questions
and how formal the procedure is.161 When voir dire is conducted by
a judge, “subjects changed their answers to a significantly greater
degree when they were asked to report their attitudes . . . .”162 Re-
searchers also found that the most anxious jurors were also the
most likely to lie during voir dire.163 In a study about juror honesty,
152. See id. Some jurisdictions provide counsel with questionnaires and individual voir
dire to solve this problem. Id.
153. See Mark A. Drummond, Voir Dire: Don’t Let the Judge Cut You Out, ABA,
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/articles-print/050412-practice
-points-spring12.html [http://perma.cc/AEN4-GSFR] (noting that a judge gave lawyers
exactly the amount of time they asked for voir dire: 30 to 45 minutes).
154. See McDonough, supra note 150.
155. See id. When caught, “rogue” jurors can face charges. In a DC murder trial, a
“rogue” juror winked at the defendant to let him know that she was on his side and later
conspired to hang the jury. The juror was later convicted of conspiracy and obstruction
of justice. Id.
156. Id. One jury consultant stated that 15–18% of potential jurors harbor bias and
actively seek out jury service to comment on or influence trials. Id.
157. McDonough, supra note 150. Jurors who lie as a result of fear or panic can also
be punished. A juror was sentenced to a four month sentence for failing to disclose past
arrests on his jury questionnaire; the juror had no ulterior motives but thought that he
did not need to disclose the arrests because he had never been convicted. Id.
158. Id. One potential juror was asked whether she had an abortion and feared on one
hand that her husband would find out, and on the other hand, that she could be
convicted of perjury. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds From The Garden: Lawyers
Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 178 (2005).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 177. Other predictors of juror honesty include previous juror experience.
Those who had been jurors before were the least likely to lie. Id.
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jurors were asked in court if they or their family had been victims of
a crime or if they knew any police officers.164 Voir dire was brief and
jurors answered questions mostly by raising hands.165 Only 8.9% of
the jurors indicated yes to the prior victimization question and only
7.9% indicated yes to knowing a police officer.166 However, about 34%
of the jurors or their family members had been victims and about
40% of the jurors knew police officers.167 The authors concluded that
“to a significant degree, . . . jurors withhold information or lie during
voir dire.”168 Voir dire is insufficient to prevent bias as a whole even
when the bias is not stigmatized, like knowing a police officer; it can-
not handle the very real bias against sexual orientation, religion,
and sex.169 Jurors in Rhines’s, Delp’s, and Fleshner’s respective trials
did not express their bias during voir dire and later tainted jury de-
liberations.170 Voir dire is insufficient in protecting defendants from
bias against sexual orientation, religion, and sex in the same way it
is insufficient to protect against racial bias.
2. Rehabilitation Failures to Remove Juror Bias
Even after a potential juror has expressed bias, judges may
rehabilitate or ask if he or she could set aside bias.171 The process of
rehabilitation is quick and begins with questions similar to “If the
court were to instruct you, as a matter of law, to only consider evi-
dence that is presented from the witness stand, could you set aside
your bias?”172 Next, potential jurors “agree to ignore their biases”
and are allowed to serve on the jury if counsel does not use one of
their peremptory strikes.173 Caroline Crocker and Margaret Bull
Kovera studied the effect of rehabilitation on an insanity defense.174
The judge pulled potential jurors into chambers one by one, and
gave each either the rehabilitative instructions or normal voir dire
questions.175 The rehabilitative instructions did not affect the verdict
164. Id. at 180.
165. Id.
166. Zalman & Tsoudis, supra note 161, at 180.
167. See id.
168. Id. (quoting Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM.
JUST. 451, 460 (1991)).
169. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 2, 16. Each juror answered
that he or she would be impartial and fair during voir dire, including those who later
made biased statements against Rhines during jury deliberation. Id. at 2.
170. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
171. Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative Voir
Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. 212, 212 (2010).
172. Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37
GA. L. REV. 1471, 1474–75 (2003).
173. Crocker & Kovera, supra note 171, at 212.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 216.
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itself, and so did not remove any bias the jurors expressed during voir
dire.176 “Rehabilitation did not, however, interact with juror bias to
affect verdict judgements . . . .”177 Crocker and Kovera concluded that
rehabilitation did not reduce the “negative impact of juror bias on
verdicts” but instead decreased the confidence in the verdict of both
unbiased and biased jurors.178 Jurors did not become less biased as
a result of rehabilitative instruction but instead became less sure of
themselves.179 Provided that jurors are honest about biases against
sexual orientation, religion, and sex and the trial court deigns to reha-
bilitate them, they still bring their bias into deliberation.180 Addition-
ally, if unbiased jurors heard rehabilitative instructions, they become
less sure in their verdict.181 Jurors in Patrick’s and Al-Turki’s respec-
tive trials expressed specific biases and were not removed from the
potential jury pool because they had been rehabilitated.182
3. The Inability of the Justice System to Remove Jurors with
Bias Against Sexual Orientation, Religion, and Sex
Undermines Confidence in the Jury Verdict
The Supreme Court has addressed systematic bias against de-
fendants to protect the constitutional right to a fair and impartial
trial.183 Despite previous discrimination, all races, genders, and eth-
nicities serve on juries so as to represent the defendant’s commu-
nity.184 However, as explained by Ronald Wright, “the colorblind ideal
isn’t true in practice.”185 Later discovered or known and ignored bias
have spawned a growing list of articles online, decrying the fairness of
the system.186 Before 2018, there was no empirical data confirming
176. Id. at 220. However, the rehabilitative instruction made participants less con-
fident in their verdict. Id. The authors postulate that the jurors thought that because the
judge gave rehabilitative instructions, “the judge possessed favorable attitudes toward
the . . . defense.” Id.
177. Crocker & Kovera, supra note 171, at 220.
178. Id. at 224.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 91–97, 108–14 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 29–82 and accompanying text.
184. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79,79 (1986).
185. Ronald Wright, Yes, Jury Selection Is as Racist as You Think. Now We Have
Proof, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/juries-rac
ism-discrimination-prosecutors.html [http://perma.cc/XUN5-B4RR].
186. Adam Benforado, Reasonable Doubts About the Jury System, ATLANTIC (June 16,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/how-bias-shapes-juries/395
957 [http://perma.cc/E9W7-TCLG]; Joshua Rozenberg, Verdict on Juries: Placing Blind
Trust in Them Helps No One, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com
/law/2013/may/15/juries-research-internet-use [http://perma.cc/5Z3W-MRT6]; Wright,
supra note 185.
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what those who spend time in court already knew: peremptory chal-
lenges are used to remove minorities, who are more sympathetic both
to defendants of color and defendants as a whole.187 Later removal
of white jurors does not rebalance the jury.188 As an effect of stack-
ing the jury against defendants of color, “the community become[s]
more cynical about the justice system.”189 Biases against sexual
orientation, sex, and religion weaken community trust in the Ameri-
can justice system in the same way. The public becomes aware of juror
biases in two different ways: through the internet, and through par-
ticipating in trials.190
While few people would have heard about juror prejudice against
Christian Delp’s sexual orientation in 1996, Charles Rhines’s denial
of certiorari was written about in the New York Times, the Miami
Herald, and even Snopes, a website dedicated to debunking myths
and rumors.191 Homaidan Al-Turki has his own Wikipedia page.192
The cracks in the justice system are becoming more visible and are
compounded by decreasing citizen participation in jury trials.193
As noted by Jocelyn Simonson’s article, The Criminal Court Au-
dience in a Post-Trial World, criminal jury trials are essentially a
phenomenon.194 As fewer defendants opt for jury trials, fewer mem-
bers of the public experience the criminal justice system firsthand
as jurors.195 Their experiences are limited to being members of the
audience, and thus, they have “minimal input into and receive[ ]
little information about the behind-the-scenes decisions and negotia-
tions” of the justice system.196 Despite the decreasing number of
187. Wright, supra note 185. While Wright’s data is from North Carolina, data from
Mississippi and Louisiana show similar results. Id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Mar, supra note 16; Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-
Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2174–75 (2014).
191. Kim Lacapria, Was a Gay Man From South Dakota Sentenced to Death for Fear He
Would ‘Enjoy’ Prison?, SNOPES (June 25, 2018), https://www.snopes.com/news/2018/06/25
/gay-man-sentenced-death [http://perma.cc/V5W8-7WB2]; Mar, supra note 16; Leonard
Pitts, Jr., His Crime Was Horrendous, But So Was the Reason Jurors Sentenced Him to
Death. He’s Gay., MIAMI HERALD (June 22, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion
/opn-columns-blogs/leonard-pitts-jr/article213672629.html [http://perma.cc/6HYS-ZJY7].
Rhines’s case was also notably covered by the Marshall Project before the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Maurice Chammah, Was This Man Sentenced to Death Because He’s
Gay?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 11, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/20
18/06/11/was-this-man-sentenced-to-death-because-he-s-gay [http://perma.cc/X6T5-BLE5].
192. Homaidan Al-Turki, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homaidan_Al-Turki
[http://perma.cc/83JU-6AWE] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). The Wikipedia page goes through
Al-Turki’s arrest, trial, and appeals to the Supreme Court.
193. See Simonson, supra note 190, at 2179–80.
194. Id. at 2174–75.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 2175.
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jurors in criminal cases, jurors are still lauded as an important part
of the checks and balances of the criminal justice system.197 As fewer
citizens serve as jurors and are limited to observing the rare trial,
they can no longer “perform a vital role in the American system of jus-
tice.”198 They no longer enjoy the “high duty of citizenship.”199 Instead,
they are left to rely on what they have read: stories of clear juror prej-
udice. They contrast jurors as the gatekeepers of justice and liberty
with the cold reality that jurors have expressed clear bias against
sexual orientation, religion, and sex.200 As more stories are written
about jurors’ expression of bias against sexual orientation, religion,
and sex, the public will become more cynical about the justice sys-
tem, just as racial minorities have.
IV. HESITATIONS TOWARDS EXPANDING PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ
There has been concern over expanding Peña-Rodriguez beyond
race, best typified by Justice Alito’s dissent in the case itself.201 One
of Justice Alito’s concerns was that because the Court applied the
Sixth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth, there was no framework
in limiting the exception.202 Indeed, because Peña-Rodriguez was de-
cided as a Sixth Amendment case, bias against a defendant does not
need to be limited to what have been previously decided as suspect
classes.203 Under this expansive view, bias against a defendant’s sports
team could be treated as a violation of his or her Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury.204 While surely avoiding all biases would be
in line with the proper text of the Sixth Amendment, declaring that all
defendants have a right to an impartial jury, the exception can
easily be limited by applying the Fourteenth Amendment suspect
classification test.205 Because Peña-Rodriguez used the language of
197. Why Jury Trials Are Important to a Democratic Society, JUDGES, https://www
.judges.org/uploads/jury/Why-Jury-Trials-are-Important-to-a-Democratic-Society.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
198. Importance of Jury Service, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/jury_handbook.php?id=2 [http://perma.cc
/Y65G-ZJA6] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
199. Id.
200. See supra note 16 at the comments. Commenters grapple with the juror com-
ments in the Rhines case and swing between claiming that the Supreme Court has no
respect for due process, that certain cases should have trained jurors, and that the jurors
came to the right decision regardless of any bias.
201. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 874–85 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 883 (“But it is hard to see what [racial bias] has to do with the scope of an
individual criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be judged impartially.”).
203. See id. Suspect classes have usually suffered a history of discrimination, exhibit
immutable or distinguishing characteristics, and show that they have little political
power or are a minority. Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect
Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 325 (2016).
204. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883.
205. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; id. at 868.
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the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court could easily recast the deci-
sion as being based on Equal Protection and therefore limit Peña-
Rodriguez significantly.206
As noted by Justice Kennedy in Peña-Rodriguez, racial bias is
distinct because it “implicates unique historical, constitutional, and
institutional concerns.”207 Indeed, race is incredibly inimitable in its
historical treatment. However, the law has treated other biases simi-
larly situated to racial bias under the Fourteenth Amendment.208
These biases, including sex and sexual orientation, can be treated
as quasi-suspect classifications.209 Both sex and sexual orientation
suffer from historical prejudice and are distinguishing characteristics
to a degree.210 While race is unique in its deeply entrenched history
of bias, it is not so unique that its characteristics cannot be applied
to sexual orientation or sex. Nor is there a clear basis from distin-
guishing biases against sexual orientation, sex, religion, or race
from the juror misconduct testimony allowed by Rule 606(b).211
Another hesitation over expanding Peña-Rodriguez is whether
other biases are prevalent enough to consider widening the exception
to Rule 606(b). Rule 606(b) and its progeny in state jurisprudence are
strongly protected, and in some circuits, Rule 606(b) trumped the
Sixth Amendment.212 Rule 606(b) was nearly sacred prior to Peña-
Rodriguez.213 The Texas legislature, for example, specifically chose to
limit any juror testimony about deliberations by only allowing testi-
mony about outside juror influences.214 However, as previously shown,
cases in which jurors exhibit explicit bias against the sexual orienta-
tion, religion, and sex of defendants, while rare, are present.215 Implicit
bias against sexual orientation, religion, and sex are also present.216
The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee an impartial trial to only
206. See supra notes 59–80 and accompanying text.
207. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
208. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739,
756–57, 761–63 (2014). Pollvogt states that “race is the paradigmatic suspect classifica-
tion” and later qualifies bias against sex and sexual orientation as “quasi-suspect classifi-
cations.” Id. at 748, 761–88.
209. Id. at 761–63, 785–89.
210. Id. at 775 (noting that even Justice Scalia, speaking of bias against sex, “agreed
that social institutions—historical and contemporary—are permeated with prejudice”).
211. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Post-Verdict Challenges to Racial Comments Made During
Juror Deliberations, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 19 (2010) (“There . . . is no clear basis for
distinguishing juror testimony about racial bias from testimony about . . . other forms
of juror misconduct that Rule 606(b) was designed to exclude.”).
212. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 18–54 and accompanying text.
214. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b). However, other legislatures, most notably Virginia, which
had no exception prior to Peña-Rodriguez, has created an exception which covered racial
and national-origin biases. VA. R. EVID. 2:606.
215. See supra Section III.A.
216. See id.
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a majority of defendants, but to all of them.217 In the words of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., “[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.”218
The final set of reasons for hesitating to expand Peña-Rodriguez
are procedural in nature: lawyers will engage in “fishing expeditions”
searching for bias, resulting in juror harassment, and the exception
will encompass too many cases, making trials substantially more dif-
ficult to put on.219 Peña-Rodriguez addresses the first issue itself,
noting that court rules often limit interaction with jurors after trials.220
Counsel is often barred from contacting jurors after the trial through
local court rules, state statutes, and judge orders.221 Juror harassment
is also less of a concern; while juror harassment has been often men-
tioned in preserving Rule 606(b), in practice, “restrictions on . . .
interviews of jurors often result in procedures that are more disruptive
and traumatic than standard unencumbered interviews.”222
Courts should not hesitate in expanding Peña-Rodriguez for fear
that they will be overrun with motions. While the Supreme Court
only provided that a juror statement of racial bias had to be clear to
trigger the exception to 606(b), the lower courts have interpreted
“clear” to be a high bar.223 The Second Circuit held that even though
a juror had expressed that “he knew the defendant was guilty the first
time he saw him,” it was not “clear, strong, and incontrovertible evi-
dence that this juror was animated by racial bias or hostility.”224 The
Ninth Circuit has held similarly that a comment that the jury would
quickly convict the defendant if he were black to be insufficient to trig-
ger the exception.225 Given the unique legal treatment of race, it
would be anomalous for biases against sexual orientation, religion,
and sex to trigger the exception more frequently. Provided that the
lower courts treat “clear” in the same manner, it would be unlikely
for the exception to be triggered only in cases that “cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations.”226
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CONCLUSION
Biases against sexual orientation, religion, and sex have very
real effects and jurors with these biases can poison the jury deliber-
ation room just as easily those with racial biases. Voir dire fails to
protect defendants from these biased jurors in the same way that
voir dire cannot always protect defendants from racially biased
members of the jury. Other safeguards such as juror rehabilitation
also fail to remove bias based on sexual orientation, religion, and
sex. Each failure of the criminal justice system to remove bad jurors
becomes more apparent with the use of the internet and social
media as citizen involvement in juries decreases. Citizens are lim-
ited to weighing news stories about unfair trials and the American
principle that jurors should be impartial, losing trust in juries.
As of February 2019, the Supreme Court has rejected expanding
Peña-Rodriguez to any bias beyond race.227 However, expanding the
Peña-Rodriguez exception seems likely. States have already begun
to codify larger exceptions to their equivalents to Rule 606(b), sig-
naling a larger trend toward trials free of clear juror bias.228
The Supreme Court has also failed to limit illegal discrimination
to only racial bias previously.229 The Court could easily limit excep-
tions to Rule 606(b) to suspect classes under the Equal Protection
Clause and is likely to as a failsafe. The criminal justice system as
a whole should continue to embrace changes that provide fair trials
for defendants. As Justice Kennedy stated in his majority opinion
in Peña-Rodriguez, “It is the mark of a maturing legal system that
it seeks to understand and to implement the lessons of history.”230
History has taught that jurors have held and exercised bias against
sexual orientation, religion, and sex in jury trials. The principle of
the Sixth Amendment, declaring that all defendants have a right to
a fair and impartial trial, demands that Peña-Rodriguez be expanded
to cover these real biases, too.
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